Comparative Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1 (2016): 59-89
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014
www.comparativephilosophy.org

BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY
AND THE PROBLEM OF ESSENCE
JINGJING LI
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By
Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra’s doctrine
of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which
the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub
this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the “problem of
essence”. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist
phenomenology because: (1) Yogācārins, especially later Yogācārins represented by Xuan
Zang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; (2)
Husserl’s phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal
sense (Sinn) that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate
Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional
acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism.
Keywords: essence, emptiness, later Yogācāra, transcendental idealism, Buddhist
phenomenology

1. INTRODUCTION
In Ideas1, Husserl defines phenomenology as the science of essence, not the science
of matters of facts (Hua 3/5). This demarcation marks his turn from descriptive
phenomenology (the study that factually analyzes real psychological phenomena) to
transcendental phenomenology (the theory that explains essential ideal conditions that
make real psychological phenomena possible). Regardless of this turn, Husserl uses
phenomenology as the approach to consciousness. He describes human consciousness
to be the intentional awareness constituted by subjects in their interaction with objects
that appear as mental phenomena. Here, then, goes Husserl’s slogan: consciousness is
the consciousness of something for someone.
This conception of consciousness in Husserl permits, at least in principle, the
possibility of comparative studies between Husserl’s phenomenology and Yogācāra
________________________
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Buddhism. Characterized by its doctrine of vijñāptimātra (Consciousness-only),
Yogācāra Buddhism (henceforth Yogācāra) has been a major Mahāyāna Buddhist
school since 300s CE. According to the Chinese Yogācārin Xuan Zang (Hsüan-tsang,
玄奘, 602CE- 664CE), Yogācārins conceive of consciousness as “vijñāpti (liao-bie,了
别 )” (T31N1585, P1a29). This Sanskrit term ‘vijñāpti’ literally means the act that
causes someone to know something distinctly (Hall 1986, 8).
Many scholars remark that Yogācāra’s definition of consciousness is very close
to Husserl’s, not just from the phenomenological tradition (Iso Kern, Ni Liangkang,
Zhang Qingxiong, etc.) but also from the Buddhist one (Lin Chen-kuo, Yao Zhihua,
Dan Lusthaus, Dan Arnold etc.). Phenomenologists depict consciousness as that of
something for someone and Yogācārins demarcate consciousness as that which lets
someone to know something. For both, consciousness correlates subjective acts of
knowing with objects to be known.
For instance, Dan Arnold defines consciousness through intentionality or
“aboutness”. By aboutness, Arnold means that consciousness is always about certain
objects (Arnold 2012, 7). According to Arnold, both modern philosophers of mind,
including Husserl and Yogācārins such as Dharmakīrti in 600s CE endorse the
intentional account of consciousness. Refusing to enclose consciousness in the mind,
Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela argue that consciousness is what we enact in
our bodily experience (Thompson and Varela 1991, xvi). Since this embodied
account of consciousness is not fully developed in the West, Thompson and Varela
turn to Madhyamaka Buddhism (henceforth Madhyamaka), a doctrine that is nonwestern but more practical. Iso Kern and Ni Liangkang find it not enough to define
consciousness on the descriptive level, be it aboutness or embodiment. To
complement the definition, Kern and Ni inquire into conditions that make these
intentional acts possible on the interpretive level. Now that both Husserl and
Yogācārins demarcate consciousness on these two levels, Kern is convinced of the
“universality” of Husserl’s phenomenology (Kern 2012, 154). Following Kern, Ni
articulates the two-level as a “twofold structure”1: intentionality on the surface and
subjective ideality deep down (Ni 2010, 81-84). Under this conception of
consciousness, Ni puts forward his comparative project called “Consciousness-only
phenomenology” that infuses textual analysis in Yogācāra with Husserl’s factual
analysis (Ni 2010, 81-86).
1

Ni argues that “although Yogācāra Buddhism does not directly adopt any concept similar to
‘intentionality’ in Phenomenology in the analysis of consciousness, it still shares many common points
with Phenomenology”, among which Ni enumerates five similarities: enacting reflection or
introspection in the analysis of consciousness; deconstructing the subject-object dichotomy; adopting
reduction as the method; advocating the twofold structure of consciousness, twofold as the surfacestructure and the deep-structure; recognizing the relation between objectivating and non-objectivating
or between the founding and the founded acts (Ni 2010, 81-84). In the meantime, Ni also clarifies the
differences between Yogācāra and Husserl: 1) Yogācāra philosophy contains more practical, more
moral elements than Husserl’s Phenomenology; 2) due to its religiosity, Yogācāra accounts for
consciousness in the hope of justifying Buddhist faith whereas Husserl’s phenomenology is a rigorous
science; 3) after explicating the constitution of consciousness, Yogācāra proceeds to negating
subjectivity, a step that is not advanced by Husserl (Ni 2010, 84-86).
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Most comparative scholars expect their studies to open dialogues between the
East and the West. Under this expectation, they treat, consciously or unconsciously,
Husserl’s phenomenology and Yogācāra philosophy as two separate entities. Notably,
Dan Lusthaus disputes this dualistic approach in his Buddhist Phenomenology 2
(Lusthaus 2003, vi). As Lusthaus claims, he does not want to pose a dichotomy
between Yogācāra on the one hand and phenomenology on the other (Lusthaus 2003,
vi). Rather, he translates Yogācāra Buddhism to a transcendental phenomenology in
the Husserlian sense (Lusthaus 2003, viii). This translation is referred to by Lusthaus
as ‘Buddhist Phenomenology’ the mission of which is to bridge gaps between eastern
and western cultures (Lusthaus 2003, vii).
Regardless of his fruitful findings, I find Lusthaus’s project vulnerable to one
meta-epistemological 3 problem that has been discerned by many comparative
scholars cited above. Arnold contrasts Dharmakīrti’s “epistemic idealism” with the
“cognitive-scientific physicalism” in modern philosophy of mind4 (Arnold 2012, 1117). Thompson and Varela suspend discussions as such insofar as they do not intend
to establish a unified mind-body theory (Thompson and Varela 1991, xviii). Ni also
eschews contradictions between Husserl and Yogācāra by orienting his
Consciousness-only phenomenology towards epistemology.
I dub this meta-epistemological problem the ‘problem of essence’. Buddhist
philosophy rejects any type of essentialism, due to Buddha’s teaching of emptiness.
According to this teaching, all objects, be it the world or the human self, do not have
permanent essence. To the contrary, Husserl formulates his phenomenology as the
science of essence that stresses the importance of subjectivity. Given these two
different attitudes towards essence, how can we advocate such a Buddhist
phenomenology both as a science of essence and as an anti-essentialistic philosophy
of religion? Or, how can we justify the compatibility between the phenomenological
essence and Buddha’s teaching of emptiness?
Most comparative scholars evade this problem by focusing on the epistemological
side of Yogācāra and phenomenology. In this way, they can remain neutral towards
meta-epistemological issues. Yet, if we follow Lusthaus, we must confront the
problem of essence so as to defend Buddhist phenomenology against it. I plan to
2

To contrast Lusthaus’s ‘Buddhist Phenomenology’, I do not put ‘phenomenology’ in its upper case in
my articulation of ‘Buddhist phenomenology’.
3
By ‘meta-epistemological’, I mean any metaphysical and ontological presuppositions prior to
epistemology. I deliberately avoid the term ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ for two reasons. First, many
Buddhist scholars doubt whether we can directly transport these western philosophical terms into
Buddhism because ‘ontology’ or ‘metaphysics’ carries substantial meaning and this meaning
contradicts Buddha’s teaching of emptiness (Xia 2002, 133-139; Fu 2002, 15-27). Second, in the
Husserlian scholarship, a term as “ontological” or “metaphysical” also becomes problematic because
Husserlians are still debating over Husserl’s attitude to metaphysics. I will come back to this debate in
section three.
4
Arnold worries that Dharmakīrti (as an anti-physicalist and an idealist) is vulnerable to his own
critique of physicalism. Arnold’s main argument is that: since Dharmakīrti affirms the function of
causal laws, he shares partly the worldview of physicalists; then, how could Dharmakīrti validly
critique physicalists when his view does not differ too much from the latter? (Arnold 2012, 47).
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resolve this problem by demarcating the sense in which Yogācāra’s 5 account of
emptiness, with particular focus on that in Xuan Zang, countenances the Husserlian
essence.
On the Buddhist side, I contend that later Yogācārins, unlike Mādhyamikas and
early Yogācārins, advocate a positive view of the existent because they attribute
nominal existence to illusory dharmas and real existence, though not in a substantial
sense, to consciousnesses. By this positive articulation, they remedy the problematic
accounts of emptiness in Madhyamaka and early Yogācāra. On the phenomenological
side, Husserl formulates essence as the ideal meaning or sense (Sinn) that ensures
objectivity of mental phenomena in subjective consciousness, not as any a-spatiotemporal substance. Since Yogācāra’s emptiness is not a void and the Husserlian
essence is not a substance, we can resolve the problem of essence. Subsequently, I rearticulater Yogācāra Buddhism as a transcendental phenomenology in the Husserlian
sense: epistemologically it enriches Husserl’s account of intentional consciousness
and meta-epistemologically it conforms to Husserl’s transcendental idealism6.
To tackle the problem of essence, I also expose my paper to many controversies.
The first controversy concerns the Orientalistic7 romanticization of religions: scholars
5

Since half of my paper is about Yogācāra, I want to carefully define this term. Yogācāra, as most
Buddhist schools, accommodates various sectarian differences, far from being a school of
homogeneous views. Keeping in mind these sectarian differences, I highlight the distinction between
early Yogācāra (wei-shi-jin-xue, 唯識今學) and later Yogācāra (wei-shi-gu-xue, 唯識古學), a topic I
will come back to in section two. In particular, I show that it is not early Yogācāra but later Yogācāra
that eventually resolves inconsistencies in Madhyamaka’s account of emptiness. Besides, I do not
think it is possible for me to advocate an overall compatibility between Buddhism and Husserl’s
phenomenology. Here, I have put aside anther doctrinal debate among Buddhists on whether
Yogācārins embrace essentialism and thus violate Buddha’s teaching of emptiness.
6
I will elaborate the meaning of transcendental idealism later in section three. Here, I want to highlight
the difference between early Yogācārins and later Yogācārins on their respective meta-epistemological
positions. Scholars are still debating on the way in which we can properly demarcate Yogācāra’s
idealism. Lambert Schmithausen interprets it as a metaphysical idealism – “there are no entities,
especially no material entities, apart from consciousness, or more precisely, apart from the various
kinds of mind (citta) and mental factors or mind-associates (caitta)” (Schmithausen 2005, 1). Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee considers it as an absolute idealism so that Yogācāra can surpass Madhyamaka’s
dialectical idealism (Chatterjee 1962, 27-28). Alex Wayman casts doubt on Chatterjee’s reading of
“consciousness as the sole reality” because the idealism in Yogācāra is as such “in respect to content,
this system is realistic; in respect to form, it is idealistic” (Wayman 1965, 67). Thomas Kochumuttom
prefers to dub it ‘realistic pluralism’, not ‘monistic idealism’ (Kochunuttom 1982, 21). Dan Lusthaus
portrays it as transcendental idealism. Most scholars acknowledge Yogācāra’s critique of metaphysical
realism. Before advocating my own interpretation, I want to point out one factor that causes the
perplexity of Yogācāra’s idealism, that is, Yogācārins offer at least two meta-epistemological theories.
As I shall show in the conclusion, while early Yogācāra embraces metaphysical idealism, later
Yogācāra advocates transcendental idealism. Due to this contrast, I would be hesitated to bring
Yogācāra’s idealism under one brand. Besides, Lusthaus did not give a clear definition of
transcendental idealism. Due to the unclarity, Lusthaus’s interpretation of Yogācāra has been defied by
scholars like Schmithausen.
7
I use the term Orientalistic, not Orientalist because I intend to accommodate two different but related
vantage points. One is Orientalism that posits the duality between the rational West and the non-
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usually posit a dichotomy between the non-rational East and the rational West in
intercultural dialogues. While remaining neutral to this dichotomy, I agree on Robert
Sharf’s critique that by romanticizing, scholars over-homogenize eastern and western
thoughts (Sharf 1993, 43).
The second issue is referred to as the “cult of nothingness” by Roger-Pol Droit,
that is, scholars often inappropriately simplify Buddha’s teaching of emptiness to a
negation of the world and the self (Droit 2003, 22-23). Doctrinally, however, as I will
show in this paper, Buddhists develop much more complicated accounts of emptiness
than a “cult of nothingness”. Not just do Yogācārins disagree with Mādhyamikas,
even inside the Yogācāra School, early Yogācārins and later Yogācārins have debated
on the demarcation of emptiness.
Amid the third controversy, scholars question Chinese Buddhism’s authenticity.
Many of them regard Chinese Buddhism as an inauthentic sinicization of Indian
Buddhism (Ch’en 1973, 5; Zürcher 2007, 4).While not engaging with this issue of
authenticity, I support Lin’s view that the Chinese scholarship on Yogācāra has long
been ignored but these resources will contribute to contemporary studies on Yogācāra
(Lin 1999, 231-247).
2. EMPTINESS IN MADHYAMAKA AND YOGĀCĀRA
In this section, I elucidate Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness by contextualizing
his thought in the historical development from Madhyamaka to Yogācāra. Here, I
rework Xuan Zang’s narrative to show that Mādhyamikas bring many inconsistencies
in their view of emptiness that are resolved not by early Yogācārins but by later
Yogācārins. For this reason, Xuan Zang elevates later Yogācārins’ explication of
emptiness as the optimal.
Xuan Zang advocates this narrative in his sūtra classification framework (panjiao, 判教 ): the Buddha preaches Hīnayāna dharmas on the four noble truths that
prepare audience for Madhyamaka’s secretive saying on “all dharmas are empty”, but
the Buddha finalizes the preaching with Yogācāra’s “direct explicating of threenature and the principle of non-empty suchness”8 (T45N1866, P481a14-20). Buddhist
rational East. The other is the reversed Orientalism that appropriates the Orientalist duality but reverses
it to argue for the superiority of non-rational East over rational West.
8
Fazang writes in the Paragraphs on the Doctrine of Difference and Identity of the One Vehicle of
Huayan (Huayan-yi-cheng-jiao-fen-qi-zhang, 華 嚴 一 乘 教 分 齊 章 ) that “the tenth way [of sūtra
classification] comes from Xuan Zang, the Tang Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master. Following the
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Suvarṇaprabhāsottamarājasūtra, and the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, he
classifies [Buddha’s teachings into] three canons, namely, the three dharma-wheels. The Buddha
turned the dharma-wheel for the first time in the deer-garden when the Buddha preached on the four
noble truths. This preaching is about the dharmas of Hīnayāna. The Buddha then illuminated the
dharma-wheel for the second time in the Mahāyāna tradition when the Buddha secretively said that ‘all
dharmas are empty’ etc. The Buddha held the dharma-wheel for the third time inside the Mahāyāna
tradition when the Buddha directly explicated the three-nature and the principle of non-empty suchness
etc. (十依大唐三藏玄奘法師。依解深密經金光明經及瑜伽論。立三種教。即三法輪是也。一轉
法輪。謂於初時鹿野園中。轉四諦法輪。即小乘法。二名照法輪。謂中時於大乘內密意說言諸
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clergy in China use pan-jiao to organize sūtras translated in various periods, in the
hope of managing discrepancies within these theories. Xuan Zang, in his pan-jiao,
accounts for the discrepancy between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra like this –
Madhyamaka’s secretive saying (mi-yi-shuo, 密意說) is in consistency, not in rupture,
with Yogācāra’s direct explicating (liao-yi-shuo, 了意說) if we understand Yogācāra’
explication as an amelioration of Madhyamaka’s9.
At the beginning of Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (cheng-wei-shi-lun, 成 唯 識 論 ,
henceforth Siddhi) Xuan Zang alludes to this narrative through the two reasons for
Yogācārins to preach on emptiness: (1) clearing the wrong views of conceiving the
self and the world as the svabhāva; (2) promoting the correct view of Consciousnessonly. By these two reasons, Xuan Zang confirms the therapeutic goal of Buddhism –
emptiness cures suffering. Moreover, for Xuan Zang, compared with later
Yogācārins’ articulation (for whom, both the self and objects are illusions constantly
transformed by consciousness), other readings of emptiness 10 , such as those from
法空等。三名持法輪。謂於後時於大乘中顯了意說三性及真如不空理等)” (T45N1866, P481a1420). According to Tang Yongtong, Fazang used to assist Xuan Zang with sūtras translations in Ci’en
Temple but resigned due to their different understandings on Buddha’s teachings (Tang 2000, 174).
We can infer that Fazang was very familiar with Xuan Zang’s preaching so that Fazang’s record can be
trustworthy.
9
Many verses in the Siddhi support Fazang’s record. We locate one of them in the section on the threenon-nature (triniḥsvabhāvatā). Here, Xuan Zang poses the question: “if there are three natures, why
the World Honored preaches that ‘all dharmas are not svabhāva’ (若有三性。如何世尊說一切法皆
無自性) (T31N1585, P47c24)”. Xuan Zang answers that this saying from the Buddha is articulated
only in the secretive way, not in the explicit manner. Explicitly, it is not that all dharmas do not have
any nature – dhamas do have certain nature, albeit this nature is not the own nature qua svabhāva
(T31N1585, P48a5-6).
10
For the translation of Xuan Zang’s Siddhi, I have consulted Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s French
translation and Francis H. Cook’s English translation. At the beginning of the Siddhi, Xuan Zang
writes about the purposes of Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā. The first purpose is “for those who
do not fully comprehend（mi, 迷, vipratipanna）or wrongly understand（miu, 謬, apratipanna）the
two empties (二空，pudgalaśūnyatā, dharmaśūnyatā) to acquire correct comprehensions. The correct
comprehensions are for the detachment from two strong hindrances (āvaraṇa). The two hindrances are
generated by the two attachments (ātmangrāha, dharmagrāha). If the two empties are realized, the
hindrances will be detached (今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故。由我法
執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷) (T31N1585, P1a9-10). The second purpose is “for those, who
wrongly attach to the permanent self (ātman) and to permanent objects (dharma) and for those who do
not fully understand Consciousness-only (vijñāptimātra), to realize the two empties and to truly know
the meaning of Consciousness-only (又為開示謬執我法迷唯識者。令達二空。於唯識理如實知故)
(T31N1585, P1a13-14)”. The last purpose is “for those who do not fully comprehend or wrongly
understand the meaning of Consciousness-only. Those people either consider external objects
(bāhyārtha) as consciousness which are not inexistent; or regard inner consciousness as external
objects which are not existent; or consider that all consciousnesses derive from one original
consciousness, albeit these various consciousnesses have respective functions; or regard mental factors
without citta to be the non-existent. Vasubandhu intends to refute these diverse wrong conceptions in
order to promote the true understanding of the profound and wondrous meaning of Consciousness-only
(復有迷謬唯識理者。或執外境如識非無。或執內識如境非有。或執諸識用別體同。或執離心無
別心所。為遮此等種種異執。令於唯識深妙理中得如實解故作斯論)（T31N1585，P1a14-18)”.
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Sarvāstivādins (for whom, external world has real existence), from Mādhyamikas (for
whom, inner consciousness does not exist at all), and from early Yogācārins (for
whom, there is an original consciousness that serves as the condition for all dharmas),
are just not-so-correct (T31N1585, P1a13-18).
By focusing on the conception of emptiness, I re-articulate Xuan Zang’s narrative
as follows: Hīnayānas do not understand emptiness as the negation both of the
permanent self and of the permanent world; Mādhyamikas attain the correct
understanding of emptiness but their secretive saying contains inconsistencies; early
Yogācārins do not fully distance themselves from Mādhyamikas so that they fail to
resolve these inconsistencies; only later Yogācārins ameliorate Mādhyamikas’
secretive saying by their direct explicating. For this reason, Xuan Zang elevates later
Yogācārins’ interpretation of emptiness to the most ideal.
Now, let us revisit the account of emptiness in Madhyamaka, its advance from
Hīnayāna, and its problems. This negative approach to emptiness unfolds primarily in
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (zhong-lun,中論, henceforth MMK). Nāgārjuna
contests the opposition between emptiness and dependent co-arising by portraying coarising as “neither arising nor perishing; neither permanent nor terminate; neither
identical nor different; neither coming nor going” 11 (T30N1564, P1b14-15). A
portrait as such alludes to Nāgārjuna’s middle way – emptiness is neither identical
with nor different from illusions. By illusions, I do not mean wrong perceptions. Nor
do I use illusion to translate a specific Buddhist term. Rather, I consider illusions as
dharmas that dependently co-arise, seeming to be permanently real12. For Nāgārjuna,
emptiness sublates dualistic views between being/arising and non-being/perishing.
As per Vallée Poussin, these three purposes are articulated respectively by Sthiramati, Citrabhānu, and
Dharmapāla in their interpretations of Vasubandhu (Vallée Poussin 1928, 3-5). In light of Vallée
Poussin’s explanation, I conclude two goals for Vasubandhu to preach on Consciousness-only:
clearing the wrong view of conceiving self and objects as svabhāva (as in the first purpose) and
clarifying the correct view of Consciousness-only (as in the second and third purposes). Those who
could not correctly understand the doctrine of Consciousness-only are ordinary people, senika heresy
(as in the second purpose), and clergy from other Buddhist schools (as in the last purpose). These
Buddhist schools are Sarvāstivāda (external objects or the bāhyārtha have real existence as
consciousness), Madhyamaka (inner consciousness, as external objects, do not exist), early Yogācāra
(all consciousnesses derive from one original consciousness).
11
For the translation of the MMK, I mainly consult the Chinese translation from Kumārajīva and the
English translation from Siderits and Katsura. The Chinese translation is “不生亦不滅, 不常亦不斷,
不一亦不異,不來亦不出” MMK 1:1-2 (T30N1564, P1b14-15). Siderits and Katsura translate directly
from Sanskrit that “neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the eternal, neither
singularity nor plurality, neither the coming nor the going” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 13). However, I
conjecture that regarding the characteristics of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda), it is more
suitable to translate them as adjectives, not nouns. Plus, I revise Siderits and Katsura’s translation of
the third pair of neither-nor into neither identical nor different insofar as it alludes to the identity of
dharmas – as per Piṅgala, “if they are all identical, it is impossible to have cause and effect in the same
way that if they are all different, they can not succeed one after another (若一則無緣。若異則無相續
)” (T30N1564, P2a4-5).
12
Given this definition of illusion, I interchangeably use ‘illusion’, ‘illusory dharma’, and ‘illusory
image’.
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This portrait might make little sense for common people. Mādhyamikas will find this
confusion quite normal because our common sense entails only the conventional truth
(saṃvṛtisatya) about illusory dharmas. Eventually, we sublate common sense for the
ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) in which we know emptiness as neither being nor
non-being.
However, how is one to discern emptiness if emptiness becomes ineffable on the
ultimate level? When scholars try to articulate the ineffability of emptiness, they fall
into debate. In the Madhyamaka scholarship 13 , we can enumerate at least four
explications of Nāgārjuna’s emptiness. First, absolutists construe emptiness as the
ultimate reality or the absolute noumena. All co-arising dharmas derive from the
absolute noumena so that dharmas are relative phenomena (Murti 1955, 251). Truths
about these relative dharmas are conventional. Since the conventional truth expresses
nothing about the absolute reality, this truth becomes a “courtesy” (Murti 1955, 252).
Eventually, for the ultimate truth of the absolute, this courtesy is to be ‘sacrificed’.
Some scholars attack the first reading for their substantializing of emptiness. For
these scholars, emptiness is not an absolute reality but a pure void (Narain 1964, 316318). Since these scholars read emptiness as a negation of any possible existence,
their reading is branded nihilism (Yao 2010, 85). For nihilists, although we can speak
of emptiness (śūnyatā) on the conventional level, ultimately emptiness is ineffable
(Narain 1964, 336). Now that the ultimate truth of emptiness transcends languages
and thinking, Nāgārjuna also embraces epistemic skepticism. This becomes the third
or the skeptic reading—emptiness in Nāgārjuna nullifies concepts. After negating the
conventional truth, we acquire a more objective view called the ultimate truth (Ganeri
2001, 43-47). In this understanding, skeptics allocate the ultimate truth in a logical
order higher than the conventional one. Instead of giving another positive definition,
anti-realists in the fourth reading define emptiness as the method of disputing
Ābhidharmic realism –what we hold to be true on the conventional level is merely
conceptually constructed; eventually, “we cannot give content to the metaphysical
realist’s notion of a mind-independent reality” (Siderits 1988, 321-324). Therefore,
emptiness is the way of rejecting viewing reality as mind-independent.
If the secretive saying or the negative approach shows the gist of Nāgārjuna’s
MMK, I conjecture that Nāgārjuna would find the fourth reading, a reading that is
articulated negatively, more plausible. Let me explain first why the first three
readings are not fully correct. If emptiness were a pure void and negated any
existence, then nothing would exist and thus nothing could arise or perish. Contra the
nihilistic reading and the skeptic reading, Nāgārjuna argues that emptiness is not a
pure negation. Otherwise, emptiness could not be identical with the dependent coarising 14 . Nor would the four noble truths hold true 15 . Yet, on the other hand, if
13

Here, I am indebted to our reading group on the MMK organized by Dr. Antoine Panaïoti. He listed
the four readings in the handouts for the first session of our reading group. We can also infer these four
readings from his book Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy (Panaïoti 2013, 18). In order to facilitate
the unfolding of my argument, I re-organize the order of the four readings.
14
As Nāgārjuna says in MMK 25:1-3, “if all dharmas were empty, there would be neither arising nor
perishing. [If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is nirvāṇa that is called (若一切法空，
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emptiness were an ultimate reality, this reality could not accommodate any changes.
Likewise it could not permit arising and perishing. Contra the absolutist reading,
Nāgārjuna depicts no absolute reality underneath all dependent arising dharmas16.
As Nāgārjuna says, “the dependent co-arising, we declare [it] to be emptiness. It
is also a dependent concept; just that is the middle way”17 (T30N1564，P33b11-12).
We see emptiness as such in the middle of an absolute nothingness and an ultimate
reality – it is a non-duality of duality (a dichotomy advocated by absolutists between
relative dharmas and absolute reality) and non-duality (the negation of the relativeabsolute duality)18. Thus, Sengrui remarks that the term ‘middle’ reveals the gist of
the MMK19.
Then, why the fourth reading is more plausible? As we have seen, by means of
the middle way, Mādhyamikas depart from Hīnayāna teachings, a departure that
advances Buddhist philosophy to another level. As Gadjin Nagao identifies,
Madhyamaka elevates the conception of emptiness to the core of Buddhism through
its radical critique of Hīnayāna realism as well as any metaphysical theories that are
oriented with the dualistic view of being and non-being – nirvāṇa is no longer a
higher reality or the antidote to saṃsāra because nirvāṇa neither affirmas nor negates
saṃsāra (Nagao 1991, 213-214). Since Nāgārjuna uses emptiness to refute any
dualistic views, he shall object to both metaphysical realism and idealism.
Although Nāgārjuna invalidates dualistic doctrines by his articulation of
emptiness, he fails to make his arguments consistent. First, he renders the nature of
co-arising dharmas on the conventional level ambivalent. If emptiness is identical to
co-arising dharmas, how could dharmas be empty at the moment they co-arise? (Yao
2014, 320-321). Second, he makes the ultimate truth impossible for us to know. If
there is an ultimate truth of emptiness as such, we would know it (Burton 1999, 4-5).
Yet, how can we know an object qua emptiness when we cannot assume this object to
無生無滅者，何斷何所滅,而稱為涅槃)? (T30N1564, P34c15-16) If all dharmas were not empty,
there would be neither arising nor perishing. [If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is
nirvāṇa that is called (若諸法不空，則無生無滅，何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃) ? (T30N1564,
P34c21-22) Neither acquired nor abandoned, neither terminate nor permanent, neither arising nor
perishing; thus is nirvāṇa to be called (無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃)（
T30N1564, P34c26-27)”.
15
Nāgārjuna says in MMK 24:1 that “if all dharmas were empty, there would be neither arising nor
perishing. [If so,] how could the four noble truths exist (若一切皆空，無生亦無滅，如是則無有，
四聖諦之法)?” (T30N1564,P32b13-14).
16
Nāgārjuna says in MMK 24:19 that “there is no one single dharma that does not arise because of
dependent co-arising. Thus, among all dharmas, there is no one that is not empty (未曾有一法，不從
因緣生，是故一切法，無不是空者)”（T30N1564，P33b13-14).
17
MMK 24：18 眾因緣生法，我說即是無。亦為是假名，亦是中道義.
18
Here, I borrow the terminology of “nonduality of duality and nonduality” from Victor Hori. In his
discussion of Kenshō, Hori uses this terminology to indicate that Kenshō or satori is not merely a
negation of dualistic thinking because this negation per se is still dualistic (Hori 2000, 285).
19
Sengrui writes, “MMK has five hundred verses, composed by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. The title of the
book is ‘middle’ that has already illuminated its content (中論有五百偈。龍樹菩薩之所造也以中為
名者。照其實也)” (T30N1564, P1a6-7).
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exist? The third problem is that of logical infinite regress. If the ultimate truth is the
truth of a higher order because we acquire the ultimate truth by sublating the
conventional truth, then we can continue to sublate this ultimate truth by another
higher truth, so on ad infinitum. Given these problems, we do not know if Nāgārjuna
really fails to define emptiness consistently or if he is using these inconsistencies to
convince us of reason’s limitation (Hayes 1989, 159; 166).
For Xuan Zang, it is not fully correct for us to articulate emptiness in a negative
way. Rather, the secretive saying shall prepare us for the positive articulation of
emptiness. Dharmas are empty because they are transformed by the underlying
consciousness, not because this consciousness and its transformations have no
existence. If we negate the existence of consciousness and its transformations, as per
Xuan Zang (as well as Yao), we render ambivalent the nature of conventional truth.
That is why the Buddhas deem anyone who conflates emptiness with the pure void to
be incurable20.
On the basis of Mādhyamikas’ implicit teachings, Yogācārins refashion the
conception of emptiness by affirming the existence of consciousness. Gadjin Nagao
depicts this positive approach to emptiness as Yogācārins’ insight of “absolute
emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214). Fairly, Nagao conceives of the
development from Madhyamaka’s negative saying to Yogācāra’s positive explicating
as the maturation from Madhyamaka’s “awareness of emptiness” to Yogācāra’s
conception of “absolute emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214).
Historically, however, it is a gradual process for Yogācāra to emerge out of and to
eventually depart from Madhyamaka. In the transitional phase, as I shall show,
although early Yogācārins accounted for emptiness as wondrous being, they failed to
resolve Madhyamaka’s inconsistencies. Because of their failure, Xuan Zang also
categorizes early Yogācārins’ teachings as ‘not-so-correct readings of emptiness’.
Indian Buddhists portray the divide inside Yogācāra as such: early Yogācārins
negate the existence of illusory images/dharmas but later Yogācārins affirm it. For
this reason, they dub early Yogācāra nirākāravijñānavāda (Consciousness-only
without illusory images) in contrast to later Yogācāra, the sākāravijñānavāda

20

Xuan Zang responds to the third objection to vijñānaptimātra that “‘Yet, regarding this
vijñānaptimātra, is it not empty? If not, why?’ Because it is not to be grasped or attached. It is so
because by emptiness of dharma, we mean that dharmas, which are transformed by consciousness and
are falsely grasped as real, are unattainable in principle. We say emptiness of dharma not because
vijñānaptimātra, which is ineffable but can be realized by correct wisdom, does not exist. If
consciousness as such does not exist, the conventional truth does not exist either. The inexistence of
the conventional truth results in the inexistence of the ultimate truth. It is so because the conventional
and the ultimate are interdependent. People who negate the twofold truth misunderstand emptiness.
They are considered as incurable by the Buddhas. Thus, we shall know that all dharmas are empty and
also not empty (此唯識性豈不亦空。不爾。如何。非所執故。謂依識變妄執實法理不可得說為
法空。非無離言正智所證唯識性故說為法空。此識若無便無俗諦。俗諦無故真諦亦無。真俗相
依 而 建 立 故 。 撥 無 二 諦 是 惡 取 空 。 諸 佛 說 為 不 可 治 者 。 應 知 諸 法 有 空 不 空 )” (T31N1585,
P39b14-19).
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(Consciousness-only with illusory images) 21 . Yao delineates a genealogy of this
division as follows (Yao 2005, 122),
Nirākāravijñānavādin—Asaṅga—Vasubandhu—Sthiramati—Paramārtha and Bodhiruci
Sākāravijñānavādin—Dignāga—Dharmapāla – Dharmakīrti—Xuan Zang and Kuiji

Let me now clarify the point earlier that early Yogācāra fails to fully distance
itself from Madhyamaka. For early Yogācārins (such as Sthiramati and Nanda), all
dharmas, all consciousnesses, all mental factors are transformed from one original
consciousness so that all transformed illusions are false, characterized by the subjectobject duality22. Since illusions originate from the original consciousness, they have
consciousness as their nature. Then, if consciousness has the same nature as illusions,
it can not be ultimately real. That is why in the Sūtrālamkārakārikā, Asaṅga preaches,
“nothing exists outside the citta; things do not exist, neither does the citta” 23
(T31N1604, P599a19). Asaṅga compares illusions to the light projected by the citta
or by consciousness. Since the citta has the same nature as the light, if the light does
not exist, the source of the light qua the citta does not exist either.
We shall raise our attention to early Yogācāra’s phraseology in their articulation
of emptiness. For early Yogācārins, illusions derive from consciousness so that they
have consciousness as their nature. Since illusions are empty, so is consciousness.
This wording is very similar to what Nāgārjuna advocates in the MMK –dharmas
dependently co-arise from emptiness as dependent concepts; they are also emptiness;
just that is the middle way.
Like Mādhyamikas, early Yogācārins also confront the same question: if illusions
have consciousness as their nature and both do not exist, how could this
21

Lü Cheng elaborates further on the distinction in this way: for early Yogācāra, Consciousness-only
means that “both the grasping subjects (i.e. the seeing parts, jian-fen, 見分, darśanabhāga,) and the
objects being grasped (i.e. the seen parts, xiang-fen, 相分, nimittbhāga) have consciousness as their
nature and both are falsely posited (古學所言唯識，無論能取所取皆是識性，皆是虛妄分別)” (Lü
1968, 75). For later Yogācāra, however, Consciousness-only means that “grasping subjects and
grasped objects can have different natures but they still depend on consciousness(皆為所緣可別有性
，但不離識故名唯識)” (Lü 1968, 76).
22
Xuan Zang writes “some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc. are transformed by
consciousness but these transformations are not as real as consciousness in the dependent nature.
Otherwise, the doctrine of Consciousness-only could not be justified because in this case,
consciousness and external objects would have real existence (然相分等依識變現。非如識性依他中
實。不爾唯識理應不成。許識內境俱實有故)” (T31N1585, P59a6-7). As Vallée Poussin comments,
for Xuan Zang, the first view comes from Nanda (Vallée Poussin 1928, 714). The last view is from
Sthiramati, “some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc. have consciousness as their nature
because consciousness transforms itself by force of perfuming as if consciousness encompassed these
(seeing and seen) parts. Suchness is also the real nature of consciousness. Thus, nothing exists outside
the nature of consciousness. The term consciousness (here) also covers the accompanied mental factors
because these factors always associate with consciousness (或相分等皆識為性。由熏習力似多分生
。 真 如 亦 是 識 之 實 性 。 故 除 識 性 無 別 有 法 。 此 中 識 言 亦 說 心 所 。 心 與 心 所 定 相 應 故 )”
(T31N1585, P59a15-17).
23
Asaṅga writes, “心外無有物，物無心亦無” (T31N1604, P599a19).
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transformation from consciousness to illusions happen in the first place? In early
Yogācāra, the nature of illusory dharmas is still ambivalent because early Yogācārins
do not affirm any existence of illusions. Due to their inability to remedy the
ambivalence of illusions but also due to their negative demarcation of consciousness
and illusions, early Yogācārins do not distance themselves from Mādhyamikas (Mei
2014, 345). Moreover, if illusions have consciousness as their nature, is
consciousness another illusion or the underlying emptiness? To answer this question,
early Yogācārins in China split into to sects. Daśabhūmika (di-lun-pai, 地 论 派 )
represented by Bodhiruci contends that among all eight consciousnesses, ālaya is half
illusory half empty whereas Saṃgraha (she-lun-pai, 摄 论 派 ) represented by
Paramārtha postulates emptiness as the ninth ādāna consciousness outside all eight
consciousnesses. Xuan Zang was determined to study Yogācāra in India because he
wanted to bridge gaps between Daśabhūmika and Saṃgraha.
Contrary to early Yogācārins who conceive of illusions as illusory light without
any existence, Xuan Zang describes illusions transformed by consciousness to be
“seemingly real as consciousness”24 (T31N1585, P59a8). By seeming reality (xu-shi,
虛實), Xuan Zang means that illusions, despite being empty of svabhāva, still have a
special way of existing. Otherwise, we could not explicate the nature of illusions at
the exact moment they arise. Xuan Zang quotes the Madhyāntavibhāga that “the
imagined (parikalpita) does not really exist. In order to indicate its non-realexistence, we metaphorically say it as names”25 (T31N1585, P47a10). As per Xuan
Zang, these seemingly real illusions have nominal existence (jiayou, 假 有 ,
prajñāptisat). We attribute nominal existence to illusions because it facilitates our
speaking and our thinking. Eventually, illusions are not real insofar as they constantly
arise and perish.
However, since we are accustomed to names, we tend to imagine seemingly real
illusions as permanently real, or, as svabhāva. In Buddhist terms, our imaginations
pollute illusory dharmas 26 . To purify the pollution, we shall remove the false
imagination from illusions that are transformed by consciousness. Illusions depend on
the transforming of consciousness whether we falsely imagine them to be permanent
or not. Transforming acts thus appear with a double identity: they generate pure
dharmas that are not polluted by false imagination or they bring about polluted
dharmas under false imagination27. “Yet, if the real dharmas do not exist, the nominal
24

Xuan Zang writes, “both the seeing part and the seen part arise by force of dependent co-arising so
that both depend on others and that they are seemingly real as consciousness (或識相見等從緣生。俱
依他起虛實如識)” (T31N1585, P59a8).
25
Xuan Zang writes, “遍計所執都無體故為顯非有假說為名” (T31N1585, P47a10).
26
In the last section, I will explicate that for later Yogācārins, what causes our suffering from
attachments is not illusions per se but our wrong perception of illusions.
27
Suguro Shinjò demarcates this hybridity as the neutrality of the second nature, a neutrality as the
transparency that can either be tinted with false duality or be as purified from this false duality.
Moreover, Suguro contends that this hybridity enables the objectification of mind in such a way that
this objectification facilitates the explication of the pratibhāsa (manifestation) of consciousness
(Suguro 1985, 152).
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dharmas do not exist either. It is so because the nominal posited on the basis of the
real causes”28 (T31N1585, P47c12). Thus, Xuan Zang categorizes the existence of
transforming acts as real (shi-you, 實有, dravyasat).
With regard to the underlying consciousnesses that keep transforming, Xuan Zang
categorizes their existence as real in an absolute sense because their existence “is not
posited on the basis of other causes and conditions” 29 (T31N1585, P47c13). The
imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) of illusory beings, the other dependent nature
(paratantrasvabhāva) of transforming acts, and the absolute nature
(pariniṣpannasvabhāva) of consciousnesses constitute the “three-nature account”
(san-xing-shuo, 三性說) in the Siddhi.
In light of the three-nature account, Xuan Zang argues that what we imagine as
substantial subjects and substantial objects are not svabhāva but seemingly real
dharmas. These seemingly real dharmas are transformed by consciousness, constantly
arising and perishing. In this sense, dharmas are empty, not svabhāva. All underlying
consciousnesses, since they are the origins of transformation, are the truly empty. The
defining nature of consciousnesses becomes this ‘truly empty’. As Xuan Zang
explains, “the term ‘only’ [in Consciousness-only] does not deny the dharmas
dependent of consciousness. That is why truly empty etc. also have their nature”
(T31N1585，P39a3-4). Thus, “ātman and dharma are not existents. The empty and
the consciousness are not inexistent”30 (T31N1585,P39b2). As we read in the Siddhi,
Xuan Zang says later that “the nature of the two empties [empty of ātman and empty
of dharma] is revealed as tathatā, the suchness” (T31N1585,P46b14). Therefore,
Xuan Zang has ipso facto referred to the nature of the true empty as emptiness, but
also, as suchness, as tathatā (zhen-ru, 真如)31.
Xuan Zang’s affirmation of the nature of the truly empty is further elaborated by
his disciple Kuiji who differentiates the “empty” (kong, 空) from “emptiness” (kongxing, 空性). The empty, in Sanskrit, the śūnya, is “an absence of twofold grasping (qu,
取, grāha)”. In contrast, emptiness, śūnyatā is the nature of the empty. The Sanskrit
affix “- tā” denotes the meaning of “-ness” and thus “nature” (T44N1835, P2b25-29).
This being said, our distinction between grasping subjects and grasped objects is a
false duality (xu-wang-fen-bie, 虛妄分別, abhūtaparikalpa)32. We will elaborate on
28

Xuan Zang writes, “若無實法假法亦無。假依實因而施設故” (T31n1585, P47c12).
Xuan Zang writes, “圓成實性唯是實有。不依他緣而施設故” (T31n1585, P47c13).
30
Xuan Zang writes, “唯既不遮不離識法。故真空等亦是有性” (T31N158, P39a3-4). That is why “
我法非有空識非” (T31N1585, P39b2).
31
In the verse “我法非有空識非無”, Vallée Poussin translates «空識 » as « la vacuité et la vijñāna »
(Vallée Poussin 1928, 424). And as per Vallée Poussin, “la vacuité” is tathatā, the suchness. As we
read in the Siddhi, “二空所顯真如為性” (T31N1585,P46b14). This suchness pertains to the last of the
three-nature, the absolute nature, pariniṣpannasvabhāva.
32
In the commentary of Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāga (bian-zhong-bian-lun, 辯中邊 論 ), Kuiji
says, “suchness is the underlying nature of false-duality, thus the duality without twofold grasping. But
we call it śūnya, if it is the absence of the grasping and the grasped. We call it śūnyatā for which śūnya
opens a door. The disclosed śūnyatā is suchness. In Sanskrit, śūnya is the name of empty; śūnyatā is
the name of suchness or emptiness. That is why we translate in Chinese the śūnyatā as the nature of
29
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false duality in the last section. If we can empty this false duality from consciousness,
we disclose the nature of truly empty consciousnesses, a nature called emptiness or
suchness 33 . Thus, emptiness is the defining feature of consciousnesses that keep
transforming, albeit we no longer pose on this transformation any false duality. Due
to its constant transforming, even truly empty consciousness is not a svabhāva but a
dynamic flow in constant change as waterfalls and torrents.
In this articulation of emptiness, Xuan Zang affirms the existence both of
consciousnesses (i.e. true nature of being empty) and of illusory beings (i.e. the
nominal existence or seeming reality). Consequently, Xuan Zang bestows on
emptiness a twofold meaning: first, we realize that illusory dharmas are empty and
have only nominal existence; then, we remove falsely imagined nature from these
illusions in order to reveal the nature of being empty, namely, emptiness. This
realizing and revealing conform to that which Nagao depicts as the “absolute
emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 216).
When Xuan Zang translated Indian texts he brought back to China, he also set up
the standard terminology for Chinese Buddhism. This terminology subtly enriches the
meaning of Buddhist concepts. In the elaboration of emptiness, Xuan Zang borrows
several Chinese categories in order to reinforce the twofold meaning of emptiness. He
translates existence of empty illusions and the nature of consciousness by several
pairs in Chinese philosophy, such as Yong (用, the functions of the substratum) and Ti
(體, the underlying substratum), or, Xiang (相, the images determined by the nature)
and Xing (性, the determinative nature). When Xuan Zang articulates emptiness as the
Xing or the nature of consciousness, he also translates illusions as the Xiang, the
images. By translating the Sanskrit term ‘lakṣaṇa’ (the characteristics)34 into ‘Xiang’
(image), Xuan Zang reinforces the idea that illusions are not non-existent but we can
positively refers to them as images due to their nominal existence35.
empty (真如是妄分別體故無二取也。但言空者。即二取無。言空性者。以空為門。顯空性即真
如也。梵云瞬若。但名為空。言瞬若多故。說真如名空性也。以多此翻是性義故)”(T44N1835,
P2b25-29).
33
Kuiji’s demarcation of the twofold meaning of emptiness can be also inferred from Xuan Zang’s
explication of ultimate no-nature as suchness in the Siddhi.
34
It seems that many interpreters of Xuan Zang undervalued Xuan Zang’s creative way of translating.
This undervaluing can be seen through the translation of ‘Xiang’ (相) in the English version of the
Siddhi. Vallée Poussin chooses to keep the Sanskrit terms or he translates it into “caractère” (the literal
meaning of lakṣaṇa) so that he did not pay special attention to the nature-image pair. Cook translates
‘Xiang’ (相) into ‘form’, in which the relation between nature and image is lost. Cook’s translation can
be supported by the Chinese translation of the term ‘form” in modern Chinese – modern Chinese
scholars translate Plato’s theory of form into 相 论 (the doctrine of form). However, in western
philosophy, form is usually paired with matter and in this form-matter pair, it is hard to say which one
is the determiner – as we see in the debates between realists and nominalists. In contrast, Chinese
traditional philosophy conceives of nature as the determiner of images. Thus, Cook’s translation of
‘lakṣaṇa’ shadows the creativity of Xuan Zang’s wording. Some scholars consider Xuan Zang’s
translation as an important step of sinicizing Indian Buddhism.
35
Then, Xuan Zang is able to articulate the three-non-nature theory as follows: In virtue of this
wording, the first imagined nature becomes the appearing or manifesting (pratibhāsa) images of
consciousness in such a way that these images (lakṣaṇa) are not svabhāvatā (lakṣaṇa niḥsvabhāvatā).
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Xuan Zang’s vantage point of being affirmative differs from Madhyamaka. Not
just does illusion have seeming existence; consciousness also has its nature of being.
We also distinguish later Yogācāra from early Yogācāra by their respective degrees
of affirming existence. In the Chinese context, Xuan Zang offers an understanding of
emptiness different from Daśabhūmika and Saṃgraha – emptiness is not the eighth
consciousness as Daśabhūmika advocates; nor do we need to follow Saṃgraha’s
postulation of a ninth consciousness. Rather, emptiness is the defining feature of
unpolluted consciousnesses.
The next question we will pose on Yogācāra is whether it can solve problems in
Madhyamaka’s account of emptiness in a more satisfactory way than early Yogācāra.
Recall the three problems in Madhyamaka’s conception of emptiness: the ambivalent
nature of the conventional truth, the unknowability of emptiness, and the logical
infinite regress. For the first problem, Yogācārins formulate the three-nature account
to accommodate Madhyamaka’s twofold truth. As per Xuan Zang, the conventional
truth contains three senses: the nominal conventional (jia-shi-su, 假 世 俗 ,
prajñātisaṃvṛti) expressed by the imagined nature, the operational conventional
(xing-shi-su, 行世俗, pratipattisaṃvṛti) shown by the other dependent nature, and the
revealing explicit conventional (xian-liao-shi-su, 顯 了 世 俗 , udbhāvanāsaṃvṛti)
conveyed by the absolute nature (T31N1585, P47b29). Xuan Zang confers the
conventional truth on all three natures whereas the ultimate truth resides only in the
absolute nature (T31N1585, P47c4). Now that the conventional truth encompasses the
nominal existence of illusions and the real empty nature of consciousness, the nature
of dharmas in the conventional truth is no longer ambivalent. For the second problem,
since emptiness becomes the nature of consciousness and has its distinct existence,
emptiness can serve as the object of knowledge. Finally, regarding the last logical
problem, if ultimate truth resides in the absolute nature, any truth in the higher order
would be accommodated by the third nature. Hereby, later Yogācārins dissolve the
infinite regress.
If we want to realize the truly empty nature of consciousness, we must make
constant effort to empty false duality. Our making-effort alludes to the importance of
subjectivity on the epistemic level and of subjective agency on the practical level.
When we return to this point in the last section, we will see how this affirmation of
subjectivity in later Yogācāra alludes to the development of Yogācāra’s epistemology
(Lü 1986, 74).36 After clarifying that emptiness for Xuan Zang is not a pure void but a
wondrous being, we can continue to examine whether Husserl’s phenomenological
essence is compatible with Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness.

A manifestation as such is also not svabhāva (utpatti niḥsvabhāvatā) since images arise because of
dependent co-arising. The absolute nature of consciousness is also not svabhāva (paramārtha
niḥsvabhāvatā), because even unpolluted consciousness is constantly transforming itself and the nature
of these unpolluted consciousnesses qua emptiness is not substantial (T31N1585, P48a11-26)
36
Fu Xinyi depicts this development as the paradigm shift from early Yogācāra’s philosophy of life
about suffering and attachment, to later Yogācāra’s epistemology (Fu 2006, 157). I will present this
change in the last section.
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3. ESSENCE AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN HUSSERL
For Husserl, phenomenology is the science of essence. By essence, Husserl means
something that is “accessible to the inquiring”, not a “mystical metaphysical
essence”, nor a sui generis being (Hua 6/217). In other words, essence is not a
metaphysical noumenon that transcends our knowledge. Rather, essence is what we
can know. As I shall argue in this section, for Husserl, essence is the ideal sense.
Before turning to Husserl’s conception of essence, I would like to, first, clarify
Husserl’s account of transcendental idealism in which essence is contextualized. In
the current Husserlian scholarship, we can pinpoint three main readings of Husserl’s
transcendental idealism: the epistemological reading from David Carr; the
metaphysical reading from A.D. Smith; and the critical reading from Dan Zahavi.
First, in the epistemological reading, Carr advocates that Husserl’s transcendental
idealism is metaphysically neutral, “not part of the metaphysics of the subject” (Carr
1999, 133). Carr’s main argument is that by means of phenomenological reduction
called epoché, Husserl has ipso facto suspended the natural existence of the world so
that for Husserl “it (the transcendental subject) does not determine the world’s being”
(Carr 1999, 134). Yet, in his later period, Husserl did address many metaphysical
issues. Regarding these later writings, Carr conjectures that either Husserl is
pondering upon other ways to develop phenomenology into a rigorous science or
Husserl is unconsciously denying the scientific feature of phenomenology (Hua
6/xxxi). By reading transcendental idealism as metaphysically neutral, Carr
understands this transcendental idealism as a development of Cartesian dualism –
following Descartes, Husserl closes the transcendental realm off from the empirical
realm.
The cost of this dualism, which Carr also finds in Kant, is the paradox of
subjectivity. It is a paradox because humans can not be both transcendental subjects
external to experience and empirical objects internal to experience, at the same time
(Carr 1999, 134). The second or the metaphysical reading is able to resolve this
paradox. Yet, Carr implicitly accuses this metaphysical reading of pushing “Kant and
Husserl in the direction of metaphysical idealism” (Carr 1999, 137). By metaphysical
idealism, Carr means the doctrine for which the real world can be reduced to mental
phenomena (Carr 1999, 108). This is, exactly, the position of the second reading,
propounded by A.D. Smith. According to Smith, “for him (Husserl), nothing ‘outside’
subjectivity” means that “if consciousness did not exist, nothing would” (Smith 2003,
179). Smith continues to explain that “nothing outside subjectivity” shows “all
objective physical objects remain immanent to consciousness” (Smith 2003, 182).
Because of this immanence, I find Smith’s reading closer to a monism in the Fichtean
sense.
Unlike Carr and Smith, Dan Zahavi initiates the third or the critical reading. As
per Zahavi, Husserl neither absolutely bestows the metaphysical primacy on
subjectivity (as in Smith’s metaphysical reading) nor completely neutralizes
metaphysical issues (as in Carr’s epistemological reading) (Zahavi 2010, 75-78).
Rather, Zahavi interprets Husserl’s idealism as the opponent to metaphysical realism
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(Zahavi 2010, 85-88). Thus, Zahavi articulates Husserl’s transcendental idealism as
the “rejection of metaphysical realism” (Zahavi 2010, 85). As we have seen earlier in
the debates on Nāgārjuna, metaphysical anti-realists refuse to view the world as nonsensible or mind-independent37.
Undoubtedly, we do not have to opt for epistemology against metaphysics or vice
versa. Rather, we locate a spectrum between the epistemological reading and the
metaphysical reading in Husserl’s conception of transcendental idealism. As Dermot
Moran interprets, early and late Husserl presented two versions of transcendental
idealism. In contrast to early Husserl who inclines to be more metaphysically neutral,
late Husserl tends to revitalize metaphysical idealism (Moran 2012, 227-237).
Nevertheless, Husserl is a phenomenologist who explicates his position more
straightforwardly than Mādhyamikas. Therefore, if we leave Husserl at the critical
reading, it is slightly unfair. On the basis of Zahavi’s demarcation of what Husserl’s
transcendental idealism is not, I want to positively account for what this idealism is.
To do so, I begin with an elucidation of Husserl’s conception of existence/being.
Husserl uses the term existence in two different ways: existence in the naturally
real sense and existence in the transcendentally phenomenal sense. By natural
existence, Husserl means the existence of actual reality in the natural spatial-temporal
order, be it humans, animals, or inorganic bodies. Since we naturally exist in this
way, as per Husserl, we take this natural existence as “straightforwardly existing”
(Husserl 1/21). This natural existence will be bracketed or suspended when we enact
phenomenological reduction called epoché. Afterwards, objects appear by means of
the second type of existence in our consciousness. Yet, what is this existence?
According to Husserl, phenomena in consciousness are not passively given to us from
the outside but are continuously constituted by our subjectivity. Due to this
constitution, existence of phenomena is not as real as the natural one but remains
transcendentally ideal. Because of this ideality, we can not always locate phenomenal
existence, such as the fictional existence, in the natural world. Nevertheless, Husserl
insists that “natural being is a realm whose existential status is secondary” because “it
continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (Hua 1/60). By this
Husserl means that real objects can be meaningfully intended by us only on condition
that they can appear in our consciousness as phenomena. Since naturally real being

37

In a very recent paper, Hilary Putnam intends to differentiate two types of metaphysical realism:
hardcore metaphysical realism (“as a term for a specific position whose main feature was the insistence
that the world can be divided into mind-independent objects and properties in exactly one way”) and
liberal metaphysical realism (for which “representation is a relation between organisms and real things,
properties and events) (Putnam 2015, 318; 325). Under these two types of metaphysical realism,
Putnam identifies two kinds of naturalism: the former to scientific naturalism for which truth is
justified by natural, physical laws whereas the latter to liberal naturalism for which truth can not be
reduced to causality but is grounded in the possible references (Putnam 2015, 312; 322). Nevertheless,
Putnam’s differentiation is very new. For Husserl, naturalism is not Putnam’s liberal naturalism but the
scientific, hardcore naturalism. Mutatis mutandis, when Zahavi and Siderits use the term
“metaphysical realism”, they mainly refer to Putnam’s hardcore metaphysical realism, not the liberal
one.
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presupposes transcendentally phenomenal being, we find the two types of existence
correlated. They are neither independent nor reducible to one another.
Consequently, we find Husserl standing in between Carr’s epistemological
reading and Smith’s metaphysical reading. This being said, Husserl is not entirely
metaphysically neutral because without out subjectivity, objects cannot be
meaningfully intended; he distances himself from metaphysical idealism because the
natural existence of empirical reality is not immanent to consciousness; he also
disputes metaphysical realism in that subjectivity determines the phenomenal
existence of objects. Natural existence is not mind-independent insofar as “it (natural
being) continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (Hua 1/60). Thus,
it is reasonable for Zahavi to demarcate Husserl as a metaphysical anti-realist.
After elucidating what Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not, I proceed to
outlining what it is. I consider Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a correlative
dualism that is much weaker than the Cartesian one. I will come back to this contrast
between Husserl and Descartes further on. Now, to be more specific, I pinpoint three
defining features of Husserl transcendental idealism: (1) Husserl neither negates the
empirical reality of objects nor advocates that all physical beings are immanent in
consciousness; (2) by affirming the natural existence that is psycho-physical, Husserl
tries to warn us of the danger of seeing only natural existence and of forgetting the
phenomenal existence; (3) the antidote to this forgetting is epoché by which we enter
the transcendental realm and connect ourselves to the world. By virtue of this
subjectivity, we constitute the transcendental realm on the condition of which the
psycho-physical world can correlate to our consciousness and can appear as mental
phenomena for us. This correlation makes the world meaningful to us. Once we attain
this meaningful life, we liberate ourselves from the natural attitude. This liberation
thus alludes to the way in which transcendental idealism “enlightens” us (Moran
2012, 241).
Now, let me clarify the point earlier that Husserl’s transcendental idealism is a
much weaker dualism than that in Descartes. The standard reading of Cartesian
dualism is that through his meditations, Descartes closes subjective mind off from the
objective world. However, we do not find the same closing-off in Husserl. By
rejecting both metaphysical idealism and realism, Husserl considers transcendental
ideality and empirical reality as two interdependent facets of the same life. For
Husserl, our mind, the subjective mind is not Ryle’s “ghost in the machine” or a mad
doctor’s “brain in a vat” but metaphysically open to objective reality.38 Because of
38

Unlike Carr who claims that Husserl is reaffirming the Cartesian dualism, I think Husserl follows
Descartes but goes beyond him. Let us recall Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. In this lecture, Husserl
keeps stressing that we need a “transformation of the old-Cartesian meditations” and a “new
beginning” (Hua 1/49-50). Thus, Husserl intends to depart from Descartes, not merely following him.
As Iso Kern identifies, Cartesian meditation is just one of the three ways for Husserl to begin the
phenomenological reduction (Kern 1964, 196). In this regard, David W. Smith dubs Husserl’s idealism
“dependent idealism” or “transcendental relativism” to gloss the relative sense of Husserl’s ontological
and metaphysical position (David W. Smith 2007, 168-181). I think my use of dualism is closer to
David W. Smith’s demarcation.
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this openness, Husserl’s transcendental idealism goes beyond the Cartesian dualism.
Like Moran portrays, each ego lives a “double life”39: we live in the real psychophysical world that is intersubjectively accessible but we also live in a world where
subjectivity (or intersubjectivity) functions as the condition for all possible experience
and as the determiner of the sense of the natural reality for us.
In his Buddhist Phenomenology, Lusthaus highlights that Yogācāra is a
transcendental idealism in the Husserlian sense, not in the Kantian sense. Instead of
elaborating on this demarcation, Lusthaus only asserts that Husserl’s transcendental
idealism differs from Kant’s insofar as Husserl does not postulate the split between
phenomenon and noumenon (Lusthaus 2003, vii-viii). However, as Philipp Berghofer
argues, whether we can juxtapose Kant and Husserl as polar opposites largely
depends on the way in which we interpret the two philosophers (Berghofer 2015,
155). If we follow the standard reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism,
championed by P.F. Strawson and H.A. Prichard that Kant separates the
transcendental realm from the empirical realm, we find Husserl radically different
from Kant. However, if we do not follow this two-world reading but opt for Henry
Allison’s one-world reading that the transcendental and the empirical are two sides of
one same world40, we suddenly realize that Kant’s transcendental idealism is quite
close to Husserl’s (Crowell 2001, 236). I contend, therefore, that we can keep open
the meta-epistemological question whether Husserl articulates transcendental
idealism differently from Kant. Yet, we will never question the disagreements
between Kant and Husserl on their cognitive architectonics – in their epistemology,
Kant stresses more conceptuality because intuition must be unified by understanding
before being represented to mind whereas Husserl prioritizes intuitions in that any
meaningful concepts find their ground in intuitions (KrV A99, B143; Hua 19/699).
Now that we have elucidated Husserl’s conception of idealism, we can proceed to
clarifying his idea of essence which will enable us to justify the compatibility
between the Husserlian essence and the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. In his pretranscendental period, Husserl uses the term essence to attack psychologism. Husserl
introduces the concept of “essence” in Logical Investigations, when inquiring into the
identity of various mental presentations of the same given object – how do we know
that we perceive the same object even when our perception of that object varies from
time to time and from place to place? Psychologists such as Brentano attribute this
cognitive identity to “empirical contingencies of the course of consciousness”, that is,
to real psychological activities (Hua 19/704). However, Husserl argues that
39

Moran writes, “human beings are physical, corporeal objects in physical, corporeal world” but “the
world has ‘being and sense’ not because of this physicality, but precisely because of the achievements
of the transcendental ego and indeed the open-ended plurality of transcendental egos acting in consort”
(Moran 2012, 239)
40
Allison advocates that transcendental idealism prescribes the universal condition for human
knowledge whereas empirical realism affirms real inter-subjectively accessible objects in spatiotemporal order. In contrast, transcendental realism postulates the existence of non-sensible noumena in
itself, and empirical idealism, similar to psychologism, equates ideality with private data of the
individual mind (Allison 1983, 6-7). We can find textual support in the “Fourth Paralogism of Ideality”
for Allison’s one-world reading (KrV A369-370).
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sometimes, the object of knowledge does not have real, empirical existence.
Examples of these objects are fictional beings, such as unicorn or vampire, or those in
our memory. Considering these counterexamples, Husserl advocates that identical
knowing should be guaranteed by ‘intentional and epistemic essence” (Hua 19/704).
By essence, Husserl means the underlying identical sense (intuitively as that of “what
object it is meant”) or meaning (conceptually as that of “in what sense it is meant”) of
mental presentations in our consciousness (Hua 19/499). If essence amounts to the
identical sense or meaning, it always entails more than what is really in front of us,
more than what we can really observe or recorde. Due to this ‘more than’, we can
never reduce essence to psychological activities.
After clarifying the condition of identical knowing, Husserl proceeds to
investigating conditions of knowledge in general. Clearly, what make our knowledge
possible can not be psychological laws. Otherwise, we would not be able to envisage
fictional objects. Then, where does our knowledge come from if knowledge is not
issued by laws abstracted from mental activities? According to Husserl, these laws
are those that confer senses on real objects. Husserl considers these laws to be purely
logical, not psychological, because they present “us [with] not what is generally wont
to be in this or that province of the real, but what absolutely goes beyond all wont and
all divisions into spheres of reality” (Hua 19/704). By saying this, Husserl implies
that pure logical laws are not real – they are ideal. Since the ideal gives sense to the
real, pure logical laws become the ground for psychological laws (Hua 19/705).
Husserl, in his pre-transcendental period, focuses more on critiquing
psychologism. He does not clarify the antidote to psychologism, although he implies
it by contrasting the psychological/real with the pure/ideal. After his transcendental
turn, Husserl makes explicit this antidote qua transcendental idealism. Therefore, it is
fair to say that Husserl’s reflection on psychologism gradually nourishes the mature
form of transcendental phenomenology.
This transcendental turn, as is mentioned in the introduction, is marked by the
release of his Ideas1 in which Husserl contests not just psychologism but also
naturalism. What characterizes naturalism is the way in which it presupposes the
world to be pregiven and mind-independent. The naturalistic worldview gives rise to
modern physicalism. For physicalism, the world is a mind-independent thing-in-itself
that runs under physical laws. Husserl describes that physicalism views object as
“individual object as such, a ‘This here’, an object never repeatable; as qualitied ‘in
itself’” (Hua 3/13). Since the world is mind-independent, we can never be sure about
our perception of external objects. What we are able to know is merely
representations inside our mind. In this way, our knowledge becomes the product of
psychological activities. This view of knowledge conforms to that which we
mentioned earlier—psychologism. For psychologism, any knowable object is merely
“something real individually” that exists as the “experienceable, real actuality” (Hua
3/13, 3/40). Psychologism and physicalism become two correlated sides of the same
coin qua naturalism.
Husserl finds this naturalistic worldview rather dangerous because under this
worldview, we take the mind and the world as pre-given without even being able to
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question this pregiven-ness. Due to this inability, Husserl portrays humans in the
natural attitude as “naïve” (Hua 3/79). For Husserl, if we naively assume the world as
such to be a pre-given mechanism under natural laws, we lose our connection to the
world. Subsequently, we also lose the chance of attaining the genuine meaning of life,
because natural laws grant us “merely ‘empirical’ meaning, the meaning of a mere
‘matter of fact’” (Hua 19/706). Mutatis mutandis, in Husserl’s terms, “a relation [as
the psychological law] to our mental organization, or to consciousness in general
(understood as the aspects of consciousness common to men in general), does not
define the pure and the genuine” (Hua 19/706). If we degrade mental activities to the
automatic generation of psychological laws, we miss the genuine meaning of
consciousness.
What defines “the pure and the genuine” is the science of essence, namely,
phenomenology. Phenomenology never stops at matter of facts. Nor does it oppose
itself to factual sciences. Rather, phenomenology lays the ground for factual sciences
because any naturally exiting fact presupposes the essential phenomenological
existence. As Husserl says, “everything belonging to the essence of the individuum,
another individuum can have too” (Hua 3/14). Underlying these real matters, essence
is the eidetically universal which “delimits ‘regions’ or ‘categories’ of individua (Hua
3/14). By eidetic universality, Husserl means that essence is that which we can intuit
universally from phenomena given in consciousness. “Essence is a new sort of
object… the datum of eidetic intuition” (Hua 3/ 16). Here, we must notice Husserl’s
stress of constitutive subjectivity – essence is not passively given in intuition; rather,
essence is that which we put into an idea after we find in the given “that is proper to
an individual itself as its what” (Hua 3/14). Essence, therefore, is the “ideation” of
contingent matters of facts – it is the ideal sense that we find universal to the real
senses of matters of facts or, in short, universal to “matters-of-fact-ness” (Hua 3/13).
I want to explicate the relation between essence and transcendental idealism by
referring back to epoché. As is mentioned earlier, Husserl devises epoché as the
antidote to the natural attitude. Epoché puts three things into brackets: first, the
natural world; second, “judgments about the spatio-temporal beings”; third, “all the
sciences relating to [the] natural world” (Hua 3/65). Before epoché, things exist in the
psycho-physical natural order. “Nothing else but the natural world is seen” (Hua
3/68). Through epoché, we suspend the natural existence of the world. Subsequently,
we also neutralize our judgments about the natural world. Thus, after epoché, we
make the world an intelligible phenomenon for us (Hua 3/68). In the process of
enacting epoché, we dwell back to our pure consciousness, in which objects appear as
our mental phenomena (Hua 3/188). When we perceive these phenomena, our
intuition reaches out to the world and makes the world an intelligible field. Every
time the subject fixes eyes on an object, the intelligible field changes accordingly in
order to make the intended object stand out. Through intuition, we build up
intentionality between the intentional object or the noema and the intending, noetic
act. Objectivity for Husserl, consequently, is not mind-independent. Instead,
objectivity in pure consciousness is always ensured by subjective intuitive acts. The
intuitive intelligible sense of objects becomes the ground for valid concepts or
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meaning-intentions41. The essence for Husserl is the intelligible sense or the ideal
meaning of intentional objects that appear after epoché.
Here, we summarize four features of Husserl’s conception of essence: first,
essence is not a mind-independent substance; second, it is constituted by intuitive acts
in the process of perception; third, essence is the ideal sense issued by subjectivity;
fourth, essence guarantees objectivity of knowledge. Because of these four features,
we can also say that essence is the product of transcendental idealism.
Phenomenology as the science of essence, therefore, is ipso facto the phenomenology
as transcendental idealism.
Husserl’s break-through in Ideas1 marks the advent of his transcendental
phenomenology. He keeps expending the limit of transcendental idealism and
consequently, the limit of essence. In the Inner Time Consciousness, Husserl replaces
the twofold noesis-noema structure with the threefold ego-cogito-cogitatum (Hua
1/87). This solipsist schema further becomes intersubjective when Husserl continues
to inquire into a “higher value-form of humanity” (Hua 27/54). These inquiries are
exemplified by his analysis of socio-historical groups such as cultural communities in
the Kaizo articles as well as his investigation of the transcultural life-world in the
Crisis. Transcendental ideality for Husserl is no longer just about ‘me’ as the subject,
but also about ‘we’ as collective subjects. Consequently, Husserl renders multidimensional the objectivity42. Since Husserl expands the dimension of subjectivity
and objectivity, he also makes essence multi-dimensional. This being said, essence is
not just that of individual perception (what perception means for me), but also that of
individual temporality in life (what my life means for me), that of communal groups
(what our communities mean for us), and finally that of all humans (what history and
the world mean for humans) (Hua 6/100, 193; Hua 27/ 44).
To close my analysis in this section, I would like to return to the problem of
essence. Given the four features of the Husserlian essence (mind-dependence;
constructability; ideality; objectivity), I examine now whether Xuan Zang’s account
of emptiness can countenance Husserl’s conception of essence. Recall the conception
of emptiness in Xuan Zang. As I have clarified in the previous section, emptiness has
a twofold meaning: realizing that illusory beings have only nominal existence, empty
of permanent existence; removing false duality from illusions so as to reveal the truly
empty nature of consciousnesses. This being said, Buddhist practitioners shall stop
seeing the self and the world as substances, ceasing to view the relation between the
self and the world as that between graspers and the grasped. If they succeed in doing
so, they remove falsely imagined nature from illusions. Consequently, they see
41

Husserl’s conception of intuition differs strongly from Kant’s. This also marks the divergence
between Husserl’s pure phenomenology and Kant’s critical philosophy – for Kant, what is universal
can only be grasped by concepts, not by intuitive acts, and concepts are already pre-made categories;
mutatis mutandis, for Kant, objectivity is guaranteed by transcendental laws in understanding, not by
that in intuition.
42
As Gurwitsch remarks, Husserl’s account of objectivity is multi-dimensional: from objectivity of
individual perception, to that of socio-historical groups, and finally to that of the trans-socio-historical
Lebenswelt (Gurwitsch 1966, 168).
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illusory dharmas as they really are, as constantly being transformed from
consciousness, as continuous arising and perishing. In the conclusion, I will elaborate
further on the way in which later Yogācārins articulate emptiness as the way of curing
sufferings. Given this account of emptiness in later Yogācāra, we can see that essence
in the Husserlian sense is compatible with Yogācāra’s conception of emptiness,
because (1) essence per se is not a substantial being nor a svabhāva; (2) essence never
presupposes the substantial existence of subjects, objects, and their relation, because
all three are constituted by flowing consciousness; (3) essence shows the ideal sense
of objects that we obtain immediately in intuition so that essence ensures the
authentic knowing of objects as they are. All these three meanings of essence
conform to Xuan Zang’s conception of emptiness. More importantly, essence
demonstrates the way in which objectivity is grounded in transcendental subjectivity.
This role of subjectivity in Husserl is also endorsed by Yogācāra – detaching false
views and acquiring correct views call for subject’s effort.
Now that Yogācāra’s account of emptiness countenances the Husserlian essence,
this result allows us to formulate a Buddhist phenomenology both on the
epistemological level and on the meta-epistemological level.
4. CONCLUSION: XUAN ZANG’S BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY
At the end of Section two, I mention the development of epistemology that further
intensified the divide between early Yogācāra and later Yogācāra. To conclude my
paper, I would like to contextualize this epistemological turn in theories of
consciousness offered by Yogācārins. By examining these theories, I intend to
articulate the way in which later Yogācāra’s account of consciousness can be
interpreted as a transcendental phenomenology in the Husserlian sense.
As is demonstrated in the introduction, Xuan Zang defines consciousness as
vijñāpti – the act for someone to know something distinctly. In Husserlian terms,
consciousness for Yogācārins amounts to the intentional relation between subjective
acts and objects to be known. Unlike early Yogācārins, Xuan Zang does not
differentiate the original consciousness from others. Due to this non-differentiation,
when Xuan Zang uses the term consciousness, he means all eight consciousnesses
and their accompanied mental factors 43 (T31N1585, P1a29). The way in which
consciousness enables someone to distinctly know something is called the
43

Xuan Zang writes, “all manifesting images are transformed by consciousness so that their existences
are postulated. Consciousness means vijñāpti [namely, causing someone to distinctly know
something]. This consciousness mentioned here also encompasses the accompanied mental factors
(caitta) because these mental factors are always associated with corresponding consciousnesses (彼相
皆依識所轉變而假施設。識謂了別。此中識言，亦攝心所，定相應故)” (T31N1585, P1a29). In
Yogācāra, the eight consciousnesses are these: first five consciousnesses pertaining to eyes, ears, nose,
tongue and body, the sixth consciousness is mind, the seventh is kleśavijñāna or manas (the delusional
self-consciousness), and the eighth is the ālayavijñāna (the warehouse consciousness). When each
consciousness transforms into various images, several mental factors begin to function at the same
time.
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“transformation of consciousness” (識轉變, vijñānapariṇāma). Yogācārins clarify this
transformation through the structure of consciousness. They formulate the structure in
four ways, three recorded by Xuan Zang in the Siddhi and the other supplemented by
Kuiji. While early Yogācārins provide the first two structures, the last two are offered
by later Yogācārins.
Each of these formulations conveys its distinct epistemological and metaepistemological implications. The first account of the structure of consciousness
comes from Sthiramati, defined by Kuiji as the “onefold structure (yi-fen-shuo, 一分
說)” (T43N1830, P242a25). By onefoldness, Kuiji means that Sthiramati articulates
consciousness as svasaṃvitti (zi-zheng, 自證), namely, self-consciousness. Although
Xuan Zang does not mention the onefold structure in the Siddhi, he implies it in one
understanding of Consciousness-only—“some say that the seen parts (nimittabhāga),
etc. have consciousness as their nature because consciousness transforms itself by
force of perfuming as if consciousness encompassed these parts” (T31N1585,
P59a15). From these descriptions, we can infer that for Sthiramati, consciousness is
the process of self-transforming into illusions. Due to this transformation, illusions,
though seeming to be encompassed by consciousness, are empty. Since illusions have
consciousness as their nature, if illusions are empty, so is consciousness. Therefore,
Sthiramati conceives of emptiness as nullifying illusions.
In the second twofold structure (er-fen-shuo, 二 分 說 ), Nanda dichotomizes
consciousness into two parts, the act of knowing called darśanabhāga (the seeing part
qua subject) and the objects to be known called nimittabhāga (the seen part qua
object) 44. Xuan Zang explicates that for Nanda, “the seen parts (nimittabhāga), etc.
are transformed by consciousness but these transformations are not as real as
consciousness” (T31N1585, P59a6-7). Nanda’s conception of Consciousness-only is
supported by the Sūtrālamkāra, in which the grasping act (grāhaka) and the grasped
object (grāhya) are compared to the illusory light of the citta/consciousness
(T31n1604, P613b12). As we have mentioned in section two, if both grāhaka and
grāhya are illusions transformed by consciousness, illusions have consciousness as
their nature. Since illusions are empty, so is consciousness.
On the meta-epistemological level, both the onefold model and the twofold model
contend that all dharmas, be it the act of transforming or transformed objects, are
illusions originated from consciousness. As long as consciousnesses transform into
illusory images, we falsely dichotomize consciousnesses into svabhāvic subjects and
objects to which we attach (T31N1585, P45c22-25). For early Yogācārins, we suffer
from attachments because we are under illusions. If we want to cure suffering by
realizing emptiness, we shall dispel illusions from the original consciousness. Let me
44

Xuan Zang introduces Nanda’s account later in the elaboration of ālaya, “yet, the impure
consciousness, when it is born as the underlying substratum, it seems to appear as subjects and objects.
It is the same for mental factors that accompany consciousness. What seems to be the object is called
nimittabhāga，the seen part or the image part (of consciousness). What seems to be the subject is
called darśanabhāga, the seeing part (of consciousness) (然有漏識自體生時。皆似所緣能緣相現。
彼相應法應知亦爾。似所緣相說名相分。似能緣相說名見分)” (T31N1585, P10a22-24).
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translate this view into western philosophical terms: all things are relative because
they are originated from consciousness and shall be reduced to consciousness. Early
Yogācārins, then, have in fact endorsed ontological monism 45 (only consciousness
really exists) and metaphysical idealism (nothing exists outside consciousness).
Unlike early Yogācārins, Dignāga puts forward the threefold structure (san-fenshuo, 三 分 說 ) – consciousness constantly flows as the underlying process qua
svasaṃvittibhāga which transforms to the seeing act qua darśanabhāga and the seen
object qua nimittabhāga. Therefore, for Dignāga, consciousness as the process of
transformation differs from the transforming act and the transformed object.
In the Siddhi, Xuan Zang contrasts the threefold structure of consciousness in
Yogācāra with that in Sarvāstivāda. As we have introduced in section two,
Sarvāstivādins embrace Ābhidharmic realism and view the world as mindindependent. In their threefold structure, Sarvāstivādins “refer to external objects as
ālambana (suo-yuan, 所 缘 , the object of knowledge); to nimitta-bhāga as ākāra
(xing-xiang,行相, function); to darśanabhāga as underlying dravya (shi, 事, events)
[of receiving external objects], because darśanabhāga is the nature of consciousness
and its mental factors”46 (T31N1585, P10b2-3). Thus, when consciousness enacts its
ākāra of representing, external objects as ālambana are directly given to us. The
existence of these external objects does not depend on our consciousness.
I find this cognitive architectonic in Sarvāstivāda rather similar to that in
naturalism. For Husserl, naturalism renders the external world independent of our
consciousness. Naturalists account for cognition as reception of external objects in
our mind. However, Dignāga identifies one problem in Sarvāstivāda’s threefold
structure. If cognizing means to receive external objects, how can we account for
memories? In memory, the objects of recollecting do not exist at present but this
“absence for now” never hinders us from recollecting these objects (T31N1585,
P10b8-9). If we recall Husserl’s attack of naturalism, we can see that Husserl’s
argument is similar to Dignāga’s. Sometimes, although the objects of our knowledge
do not have natural existence, we can still perceive them.
Xuan Zang is thus confident that once people understand the truth of
Consciousness-only, they will turn to Yogācāra’s threefold structure –“[Yogācārins]
refer to the seen image (nimittabhāga) as the ālambana; to the seeing act
(darśanabhāga) as the ākāra; to the underlying process of nimittabhāga and
darśanabhāga as the event, namely, svasaṃvittibhāga”47 (T31N1585, P10b6-7). Now
that consciousnesses flow like “torrents and waterfalls”, they constantly transform
into their own objects and the acts of knowing (T31N1585, P7c19). Here, we can
45

Readers might already notice that in early Yogācāra’s articulation, the original consciousness
becomes an absolute reality. Paramārtha refers to this reality as the Tathāgatagarbha. Further on, the
Huayan school develops the conception of Tathāgatagarbha whereas many Chan clergy accuse this
conception of substantializing emptiness and thus of violating Buddha’s teaching of emptiness.
46
Xuan Zang writes, “執有離識所緣境者。彼說外境是所緣。相分名行相。見分名事。是心心所
自體相故” (T31N1585, P10b2-3).
47
Xuan Zang writes, “達無離識所緣境者。則說相分是所緣。見分名行相。相見所依自體名事。
即自證分” (T31N1585, P10b6-7).
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pinpoint the major difference between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, that is, their
conceptions of ālambana, of the object of knowledge. Unlike Sarvāstivādins who
considers ālambana to be external real objects, Xuan Zang conceives of ālambana as
nimittabhāga, as images transformed by consciousness. While Sarvāstivādin’s
cognitive architectonic resembles that in naturalism, Dignāga’s threefold structure
resembles Husserl’s ego-cogito-cogitatum
However, Dignāga’s threefold model of consciousness is vulnerable to one
problem – if self-consciousness qua svasaṃvitti is the ground for the seeing part and
the seen part, what will be the ground for this self-consciousness? Without an answer,
we might again fall into infinite regress – we can always locate a more fundamental
ground for consciousness so on ad infinitum. Without such a ground, how can we be
sure that we are conscious of our self-consciousness? Thus, as Xuan Zang explains,
consciousness must have one more part to justify the existence of self-consciousness,
through which we can be certain of our self-consciousness (T31N1585, P10b18-22).
This fourth part is called the “awareness of self-consciousness” or the
svasaṃvittisaṃvittibhāga (zheng-zi-zheng-fen, 證自證分). Since svasaṃvittisaṃvittt is
svasaṃvitti’s immediate intuitive awareness of itself, svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti and
svasaṃvitti have the same nature. By supplementing svasaṃvittisaṃvitti, Dharmapāla
advocates the fourfold structure (si-fen-shuo, 四分說) – the seeing part, the seen part,
self-consciousness, and the immediate awareness of self-consciousness.
In light of their articulation of consciousness, Dignāga and Dharmapāla also
provide a distinctive interpretation of false duality. This interpretation begins with the
elucidation of attachments. As is mentioned earlier, in early Yogācāra, we suffer from
attachments because we are under illusions. However, for later Yogācārins, illusions
per se are not the cause of sufferings. Dharmas are illusory whose existence is
seemingly real. This being said, dharmas, be it human mind or the external world in
western terms, constantly arise and perish. This is how dharmas are – constantly
changing, impermanent, and empty. These illusory dharmas are not directly of false
duality. As per Xuan Zang, false duality is generated not by all consciousnesses but
only by the sixth consciousness called the mind and the seventh consciousness called
the manas. Through the mind, we conceptualize the world to be substantial whereas
through the manas, we mistake the eighth consciousness for the unchanging
svabhāvic self (T31N1585, P45c26). Later Yogācārins further elaborate on their
account of false duality in the theory of pramāṇa48.
48

As the theory of pramāṇa is beyond the main focus of this paper, I would provide a brief sketch of
this theory. In each moment, consciousness generates the transforming act which then constitutes its
distinct object. If transformed objects have seeming reality in only the current moment and this
seeming reality soon vanishes in the next moment, authentic knowledge is momentarily gained through
intuition. This portrait of intuitive knowing (pratyakṣapramāṇa) in Dignāga resembles Husserl’s
account of intuition – intuition is the ground for intentionality and is the authentic thinking (Hua
12/193). All eight consciousnesses and their mental factors can generate their distinct intuitive
knowledge of their respective objects from one moment to another. That is why Consciousness-only
for later Yogācāra is not about one original consciousness but about all consciousnesses (T31N1585,
P39c21). On the basis of intuition, humans always tend to extract concepts from intuitive knowing.
Concepts render the identity of all things stabilized. By conceptual thinking (anumānapramāṇa), we
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Through this interpretation of false duality, we can see that for Xuan Zang, we
suffer from attachments because we falsely conceptualize illusory dharmas into
substances, not because consciousness transforms itself into illusory dharmas.
Emptiness thus does not negate consciousness and its transformations. Rather, we
realize emptiness as the nature of flowing consciousness after we understand the error
of conceptualizing. In this way, for later Yogācārins, realizing emptiness becomes an
epistemological question of seeing things as they are without false duality, not a
metaphysical question of negating duality. This change becomes what I refer to
earlier as the epistemological turn of Yogācāra. After the epistemological turn, later
Yogācārins articulate subjectivity as the condition that bestows sense on nominal
existence and that guarantees objective knowing of illusions.
Meta-epistemologically, since later Yogācārins dispute any mind-independent
reality, they do not embrace metaphysical realism as Sarvāstivādins. Neither do they
endorse metaphysical idealism as early Yogācārins in that later Yogācārins object to
reducing the existence of illusory dharmas back to consciousness. Rather, we find that
later Yogācārins affirm the nominal existence of illusions insofar as this shows how
dharmas really are in empirical life. This objectivity of illusory dharmas is ensured by
subjectivity that serves as the condition of the meaning of nominal existence. For later
Yogcarins, seeming reality of illusions and transcendental subjectivity of
consciousness are also two sides of the same life. In this life, we realize emptiness by
cultivating genuine knowledge of how dharmas genuinely are and by dispelling false
duality. Thus, we lay the foundation for Xuan Zang’s Buddhist phenomenology that
epistemologically articulates the intentional structure of consciousness and metaepistemologically entails transcendental idealism.
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